**Three models of realist anti-moralism**

It is a widespread assumption that anti-moralism lies at the core of contemporary realism (while other interpretations emphasize its anti-utopianism or regard it as a loose mixture of ideas), and it is exactly what the opponents of realism see as a complete misunderstanding of the complex relationship between moral and political standards on the part of realists. How on earth, they ask, can we go beyond a mere "might is right" view of politics if we are not willing to accept the fact that politics must be justified by moral principles at least on the long run? Fortunately, realist anti-moralism is not so liable to this objection as it might seem at first glance. But to understand this, we need to realize that contemporary realist anti-moralism is not a single doctrine, but a series of criticisms raised against various views on the relationship between moral and political standards. We can even trace the origins of these different strands of anti-moralism back to the classics of realism and label them as the "Machiavellian", the "Hobbesian", and the "Aristotelian" models of separating political from moral standards. The first one focuses on the discrepancy between moral and political standards and asserts that what is right in politics is sometimes wrong morally. The second one emphasizes the impossibility of a consensual morality under the circumstances of the irreducible heterogeneity of human societies and attributes the role of arbiter over conflicting material and moral claims to political authority. And the third one defines the task of politics as seeking compromise between universal and particular demands. Hobbesian and Machiavellian models are obviously way more popular amongst realists. For example, Bernard Williams, Raymond Geuss or John Gray has sought answers to questions coming from the Hobbesian model; Richard Bellamy or Mark Philp use Machiavellian terms to speak about political conduct. However, the third model has its proponents too. Just to mention one example, Andrew Sabl's Ruling passion is an eloquent vindication of a non-Hobbesian and non-Machiavellian understanding of the specific standards of politics. Why is so important to differentiate between these three models? First of all, because neither of these models raises the same criticism against moralism, thus they cannot be repelled by the same counter-argument. Secondly, each model has a specific criticism against moralism, but neither of them denies the importance of morality in politics. In order to refute the claims of realism for autonomy of politics, it is just not enough to assert that every politics must have some kind of moral foundation. Thirdly, each model has its theoretical limitations, but also each has some important insight. Rather than by refuting anti-moralism altogether, we can understand politics better if we learn both from the insights and the limitations of the three different models of realist anti-moralism.